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Death is not different: The transfer of juvenile offenders to adult criminal courts 
 
 
Introduction 
 The U.S. Supreme Court first reviewed a state’s statutory procedure for juvenile transfer to adult 
criminal courts in Kent v. U.S.1  Morris Kent was a fourteen-year-old first convicted for purse snatching 
and house-breaking, placed on probation, and later charged at the age of sixteen with robbery and rape.2  
Kent was arrested, presumably admitted to involvement in these crimes after seven hours of interrogation, 
and placed in a receiving home for one week.3   
 Under then applicable District of Columbia (DC) Juvenile Code Act,4 the juvenile court judge 
could waive jurisdiction of a sixteen-year-old or older youth who was charged with a felony after the 
judge conducts a “full investigation”.5  The judge neglected to hold a hearing or rule on defense counsel’s 
motions for a hearing and entered an order that did not state specific findings.  Juvenile court jurisdiction 
was waived allowing for adult criminal court trial on the alleged offenses.6  Kent eventually appealed the 
waiver order but was subsequently indicted by a grand jury.  He was sentenced at trial to thirty to ninety 
years in prison, affirmed by the D.C. Circuit Court, and appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.7   
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the District Court’s decision,8 holding that juvenile 
offenders are provided due process protections and cited a list of determinative factors for review in 
making a transfer decision.9  These due process requirements include a hearing, notice of the hearing, 
effective assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons for the courts’ decision if a transfer to criminal 
                                                 
1
 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct. 1045, 16 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1966). 
2
 Kent, 383 U.S. at 543. 
3
 Id. at 544-545. 
4
 This section of the D.C. Juvenile Code Act was rescinded in 1968. 
5
 Id. at 547-548.  See Sally T. Green, infra note 113 (“Although Kent involved a case of judicial waiver, the Court’s 
interpretation of the jurisdictional statute and its reasoning articulates principles of fundamental fairness owed 
juveniles and the proper function/role of the state in juvenile justice proceedings”). 
6
 Id. at 546-549. 
7
 Id.  Shannon F. McLatchey, Note, Juvenile Crime and Punishment: An Analysis of the “Get Tough” Approach, 10 
U Fla. J. L. & Publ. Pol’y 401, 417 (1999) (discussing the District Court’s consideration of counsel’s motion to 
dismiss the grand jury indictment on invalid waiver grounds, but finding that the “full investigation” language of the 
D.C. Code did not require a judicial hearing). 
8
 Id. at 562. 
9
 Id. at 556-557.   
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court was made.10  The required determinative review factors include the following: the seriousness of the 
alleged offense and threat to community safety; whether the alleged offense was committed in an 
aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner; whether the alleged offense was against persons or 
against property, with the weight leaning more toward waiver if against persons; the prosecutorial merit 
of the complaint;11 the sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his 
home, environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living; the record and previous history of the 
juvenile; and whether co-defendants in the offense are being tried in criminal court.12   
The Court held that the waiver decision is of critical importance.13  While latitude is presumed for 
the determinative judicial court, it is not complete and must include a full investigation of these factors14 
with meaningful review.15  The Court stated that “there is no place in our system of law for reaching a 
result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony – without hearing, without assistance of 
counsel, without a statement of reasons.  It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults . . . 
would proceed in this manner.  It would be extraordinary if society’s special concern for children, as 
reflected in the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure”.16  In response to 
Kent, most states incorporated these delineated factors in their waiver determinative state laws and many 
included individual offenders’ amenability to treatment and threatened level of community danger.17   
The Kent decision has not been modified or overturned by the Court in the ensuing four decades, 
but a state law driven “tough on crime” policy beginning in the 1970’s and a search for less adversarial 
                                                 
10
 Id.  One year later in re Gault, 387, U.S. 1 (1967), the Court extended specific constitutional protections to 
juveniles including notice of charges, legal representation, the privilege against self-incrimination, and confrontation 
and cross-examination of witnesses. 
11
 Id.  Whether there is evidence upon which a grand jury may be expected to return an indictment. 
12
 Id.  
13
 Id. at 556.   
14
 Id. at 553.   
15
 Id. at 562.  The juvenile court must give careful consideration and “set forth the basis for the order with sufficient 
specificity to permit meaningful review” of these determinative factors. 
16
 Id. at 554. 
17
 Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver 
Statutes, 78 J. Crim. L. and Criminology 471, 477 (1987); Ellen Marrus & Merker Rosenberg, After Roper v. 
Simmons: Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal Court, 42 San Diego L. Rev. 1151 (2005) (Kent did not mandate the 
use of these determinative factors, although most states incorporated them into their laws). 
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transfer options prevailed.18  Today, a majority of states use explicitly punitive juvenile sentencing 
transfer strategies with an emphasis on public safety, sentencing, and offender accountability.19  Since 
1992 all but one state passed legislation easing the requirements to permit the transfer of juvenile 
offenders to criminal court.20  The ease of transferring juvenile offenders has been accomplished by 
expanding automatic transfer criteria, lowering age limits on excluded offenses, expanding prosecutorial 
waiver provisions, and adding crimes eligible to judicial waiver.21 
 In March 2005, the Supreme Court decidedly weighed in on this issue of felonious juvenile 
offenders again, albeit not directly.  In Roper v. Simmons the Court based part of its death penalty 
decision on noted developmental differences between juveniles and adults.22  In extending Eighth 
Amendment protections to 16- and 17-year-old juvenile offenders by declaring the death penalty 
unconstitutional23 the Court held that juveniles’ underdeveloped sense of responsibility and lack of 
maturity, vulnerability to peer pressure, and less-fixed transitory personalities make them less culpable 
than adult offenders.24  The Court recognized this diminished culpability for juveniles25 and found youth 
itself to be a mitigating factor.26   
                                                 
18
 Henry G. White, A Socio-Legal History of Florida’s Juvenile Transfer Reforms, 10 U. Fla. J.L. & Publ Pol’y 249, 
264-65 (1999).  The ensuing prosecutorial (discretionary) and statutory exclusion waivers are addressed in Part I. 
19
 See Albert R. Roberts, Juvenile Justice Sourcebook: Past, Present, and Future, Oxford University Press (2004); 
Brent Pollitt, Buying Justice on Credit Instead of Investing in Long-term Solutions: Foreclosing on Trying Juveniles 
in Criminal Court, 6 J.L. Fam. Stud. 281 (2004); C. Antoinette Clark, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent 
Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 Kan. L. Rev. 659 (2005). 
20
 See Patrick Giffin, National Center for Juvenile Justice, “National Overviews,” State Juvenile Justice Profiles 
(2003), tbl. “How have state laws governing criminal prosecution of juveniles changed in recent years?” (“From 
1992 through 1999, 49 states and the District of Columbia passed laws making it easier for juveniles to be tried as 
adults (Nebraska represented the only exception).  In general, recent state legislative activity in this area has tended 
to 1) expand the categories of offenses for which transfer is possible; 2) lower minimum age limits for transfer; 3) 
limit juvenile court judges’ discretion to retain jurisdiction over certain cases; 4) shift transfer decision-making from 
judges to prosecutors; and 5) redraw jurisdictional lines between the juvenile and criminal courts, so that cases 
involving serious, violent, or repeat offenders fall automatically to the latter rather than the former.”)  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer9.asp (visited December 19, 2005). 
21
 Id at 14-15. 
22
 Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (U.S. 2005). 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. at 1188.  (“Three general differences between juveniles under 18 and adults demonstrate that juvenile 
offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst offenders . . . these qualities often result in impetuous 
and ill-considered actions and decisions . . . (i)n recognition of the comparative immaturity and irresponsibility of 
juveniles, almost every State prohibits those under 18 years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying 
without parental consent.”) 
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 This paper advocates that the Roper decision further expands recognition of juvenile offenders’ 
decreased culpability in decisions to transfer juveniles to adult criminal courts.  This requires 
incorporation of the Court’s Roper holdings on juvenile offenders’ culpability in amendment of current 
punitive state laws.  Part I discusses the three legal options, and corresponding number of juveniles, that 
judicial courts, prosecutors, and states pursue in transferring juvenile offenders to adult criminal courts.  
Part II provides current research efficacy and outcomes of punitive sentencing strategies and finds this 
policy is counterproductive to intended goals and harmful to juvenile offenders.  Transferred juvenile 
offenders receive little rehabilitation, have higher and faster recidivism rates, and lose ties with family 
and the community to which they return.  Part III presents an analysis of all current 50 state law (and 
District of Columbia) criteria for judicially transferring a juvenile to adult criminal court.  This 
comparison shows adherence to the Supreme Court’s holding in Kent, subsequent state statutory 
amendments, and identifies minimal congruence to the recent Roper holding on juvenile culpability.  The 
findings are discouraging for anyone who believes, as the Supreme Court does in Roper, that juvenile 
offenders deserve a second (or even a third) chance and that they are truly different, and less culpable, 
than adult offenders.  The call is made for a moratorium on transferring youth to adult criminal courts. 
 
I. The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Criminal Courts 
                                                                                                                                                             
25
 Id. (“The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that 
even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.  From a moral 
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility 
exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”)   
26
 Id.  (“The relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are 
transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can 
subside.”) 
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 There are three options within state laws for juveniles to be transferred to adult criminal courts.27  
One, a judicial waiver allows a juvenile court judge to waive jurisdiction based on state law criteria.28  
Within the judicial waiver are three subtypes: discretionary waiver (same definition as the judicial 
waiver); mandatory waiver,29 making it mandatory that a juvenile court judge waive jurisdiction if 
probable cause exists that the juvenile committed the alleged offense (allowed in fifteen states - 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia); and presumptive 
waiver,30 where the burden of proof concerning a transfer decision is shifted from the state to the juvenile 
(allowed in fourteen states and the District of Columbia - Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, 
Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Utah).  Judicial review waivers account for approximately 15 percent (8,500) of all juveniles transferred 
to adult criminal courts annually.31 
 Two, direct file provisions (prosecutorial discretion) give the prosecutor discretion to file charges 
in either the juvenile or criminal court.32  Prosecutorial waivers account for approximately 45 percent 
(90,000) of all juveniles transferred to adult criminal courts annually.33 
                                                 
27
 See Griffin, supra note 20, http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer2.asp (visited January 20, 2006); 
Building Blocks for Youth, Charts Transferring Youth to Criminal Court.  
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/issues/transfer/transchart.html (visited on December 22, 2005); Patricia 
Torbet & Linda Szymanski, State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile Crime: 1996-1997 Update, Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile Justice Bulletin (Nov. 1998); Melissa Sickmund, How 
Juveniles get to Criminal Court, OJJDP Update on Statistics (October 1994); Kevin Strom & Steven Smith, Juvenile 
Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (Sept. 1998); Gus Martin, 
Juvenile Justice Process and Systems, Sage Publications (2005). 
28
 See Torbet, supra note 27 at 3; Sickmund, supra note 27 at 1. 
29
 Id.  This list is current as of the 2004 state legislative sessions.  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer_state_table.asp  (visited January 10, 2006) 
30
 Id.  The presumptive waiver requires that certain juveniles be waived to criminal court unless they can prove they 
are suited to juvenile rehabilitation.  This list is current as of the 2004 state legislative sessions.  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer_state_table.asp  (visited January 10, 2006) 
31
 See Building Blocks for Youth, supra note 27; Amnesty International, Betraying the Young: Children in the US 
Justice System, http://webamnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR5106011988 (visited December 22, 2005); Charles M. 
Puzzanchera, Delinquency Cases Waived to Criminal Court, 1990-1999, OJJDP Fact Sheet (Sept. 2003); Howard N. 
Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report 106 (1999); James Austin, 
Kelly Dedel Johnson, & Maria Gregoriou, Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails: A National Assessment, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance (Oct. 2000). 
32
 See Torbet, supra note 27.  Thus, original jurisdiction is shared by both criminal and juvenile courts.   
33
 See supra note 31. 
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 Three, statutory exclusion provisions (statutory, automatic, or mandatory transfer) automatically 
exclude certain juvenile offenders from the juvenile courts’ original jurisdiction, with specified offense 
and age criteria.34  Statutory exclusion waivers account for approximately 45 percent (90,000) of all 
juveniles transferred to adult criminal courts annually.35 
Following the Kent decision, judicial waiver had been the most common state procedural 
approach to transferring juveniles to criminal court.36  The Kent decision enumerated criteria to guide 
judges in this decision and many states adopted some of these guidelines.37  Subsequent “tough on crime” 
state policies have made judicial (discretionary) transfer decisions less frequent and statutory (mandatory) 
and prosecutorial (direct) transfer decisions much more frequent.38  Most states today use a combination 
of judicial, prosecutorial, and statutory waivers, as well as blended sentencing.39   
Judicial waivers are still the most common transfer state provision, authorizing but not requiring 
juvenile courts to designate appropriate cases for adult prosecution40 (allowed in forty-six states and the 
District of Columbia - Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Okalahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South 
                                                 
34
 See Torbet, supra note 27. 
35
 See supra note 31.  It must be noted that prosecutorial and statutory waivers are more difficult to track than 
judicial waivers.  The estimates for these two are based on cited sources.  For further review, see David S. 
Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Criminal Law, Owing to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal 
Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92 Crim. L. & Criminology 641 (2002).  Also, there are additional transfer 
classifications found in a majority of state statutes.  “Reverse waivers” allow juvenile court judges to transfer 
“excluded” or “prosecutorial” filed cases from criminal court to juvenile court.  “Once an adult/always an adult” 
provisions state that once a juvenile is convicted in criminal court all subsequent cases for that juvenile will be under 
criminal court jurisdiction. 
36
 Kent, 383 U.S. 541 at 542. 
37
 See Feld, supra note 17.  Attached Appendix delineates current state law (as of 2004 to 2006 legislative sessions) 
and Kent criteria utilized in juvenile transfer judicial decisions. 
38
 See Griffin, supra note 20. 
39
 See Griffin, supra note 20 at 1.  Robert Dawson, Judicial Wavier in Theory and Practice (45-81) in The Changing 
Border of Juvenile Justice: Transfer of Adolescents to the Criminal Court 4 (Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring 
eds., 2000).  See Torbet, supra note 27 (blended sentencing statutes are significantly different in allowing for 
juvenile and/or adult correctional sanctions on serious and violent juvenile offenders who have been adjudicated in 
juvenile court or convicted in criminal court.  Five basic models state models currently exist; each applied to a 
subset of juvenile offenders specified by statute and usually defined by age and offense). 
40
 See Griffin, supra note 20.  This list is current as of the 2004 state legislative sessions.  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer_state_table.asp (visited January 10, 2006). 
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Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming), but prosecutorial waivers41 (allowed in fourteen states and the District of Columbia - Arizona, 
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, 
Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming) and statutory waivers42 (allowed in twenty-nine states - Alabama, 
Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, New York, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wisconsin) account for a vast majority of transferred juveniles.43  Prosecutorial waivers generally provide 
no review guidelines and are subject to only grand jury review, unlike judicial waivers that allow for 
appellate court review.44 
II. Punitive Policies are counter-productive and harmful to Juvenile Offenders 
Research knowledge to date finds this current punitive approach in juvenile offender transfers to 
criminal courts is counter-productive to stated policy intentions of increased public safety and increased 
youth accountability.45  There is little evidence these state laws have reduced arrest or crime rates (Steiner 
                                                 
41
 Id.  This list is current as of the 2004 state legislative sessions.  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer_state_table.asp (visited January 10, 2006). 
42
 Id.  This list is current as of the 2004 state legislative sessions.  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer_state_table.asp  (visited January 10, 2006). 
43
 Id.  Much less frequently utilized are the juvenile blended sentences (available in 15 states – Alaska, Arkansas, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Rhode 
Island, Texas, and Vermont) and criminal blended sentences (available in 17 states – Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).  These lists are current as of the 2004 state legislative sessions.  
http://www.ncjj.org/stateprofiles/overviews/transfer_state_table.asp  (visited January 10, 2006). 
44
 See Feld supra note 17, at 119-124; Tanenhaus, supra note 35. 
45
 See Co-offending and Patterns of Juvenile Crime, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
Department of Justice, (Dec., 2005, NCJ 210360); Juvenile Accountability Incentive Block Grants: Assessing Initial 
Implementation, U.S. Department of Justice (2005) (“JAIBG required that States and localities have or consider 
adopting policies to prosecute as adults juveniles over the age of 15 who commit serious, violent, crimes.  Of the 56 
jurisdictions receiving funds, 42 reported that their policies confirmed to this objective.  As the trend in States had 
been toward toughening juvenile transfer laws, 39 States had such policies when the program began, by 2001, three 
additional states had enacted laws or adopted policies that strengthened transfer policies.  States allocated an average 
of 11 percent of JAIBG funds in FY 1998-2000 to strengthening prosecution of serious, violent juvenile offenders”); 
J. Houston & Sam Barton, Juvenile Justice: Theory, Systems, and Organizations (2005); J. Ferro, Library in a Book: 
Juvenile Crime, (2003) (The passage of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which authorized the 
imposition of harsher sentences for certain crimes committed by gang members, authorized adult prosecution of 
minors 13 years of age or older, charged with certain crimes); Howard Snyder, Melissa Sickmund, & E. Poe-
Yamagata, Juvenile Transfers to Criminal Court in the 1990’s: Lessons Learned from Four States, Office of Juvenile 
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et al., studied twenty-two states that enacted or substantially amended statutes post-1979 and found that 
only two of the states had declines in their arrest rates for violent juvenile crime after the laws became 
effective),46 reduced recidivism (Howell reviewed fifty studies of juvenile transfers to the criminal justice 
system and found recidivism rates were higher among juveniles transferred to criminal courts than among 
those retained in the juvenile justice system),47 or subsequently improved community safety (Singer found 
                                                                                                                                                             
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Department of Justice, http://www.ncjrs.org/pdfiles1/offdp/181301.pdf, P. 
Torbet, P. Griffin, H. Hunter, & L. Ryan MacKenzie, Juveniles Facing Criminal Sanctions: Three States that 
changed the Rules, OJJDP, Department of Justice, http://ojjdp.ndjrs.org/pubs/court.html#181203. 
46
 See Benjamin Steiner, Craig Hemmens, & Valerie Bell, Legislative Waiver Reconsidered: General Deterrent 
Effects of Statutory Exclusion Laws enacted Post-1979, Justice Quarterly, 23(1), 34-59 (2006); D. Myers, Excluding 
Violent Youths from Juvenile Court: The Effectiveness of Legislative Waiver, unpublished dissertation, University 
of Maryland (1999); L. Winner, L. Lanza-Kaduce, D., Bishop, & C. Frazier, The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal 
Court: Reexamining Recidivism over the Long Term, Crime and Delinquency, 43(4), 548-563 (1997) (Matched 
pairs of juveniles found that transferred youths re-offended more quickly than did their non-transferred 
counterparts); Jeffrey Fagan, Separating the Men from the Boys: The Comparative Advantage of Juvenile versus 
Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism Among Adolescent Felony Offenders, in J. Howell, B. Krisberg, J.D. 
Hawkins, & J. Wilson, eds., A Sourcebook: Serious, Violent, and Chronic Juvenile Offenders, Sage Publications 
(1995); R. Redding, Examining Legal Issues: Juvenile Offenders in Criminal Court and Adult Prison, Corrections 
Today (1999) (Criminalization of  adolescent crimes failed to provide more effective punishment and lower 
recidivism rates.  Results indicated that recidivism rates were higher for adolescents in criminal court, their re-
arrests occurred more quickly, and their return to jail more likely.  Sentence lengths were comparable.  Expected 
outcomes of greater youth accountability and lengthier sentences were not gained from criminal court punishment, 
nor was community protection increased); Lisa Stolzenberg & Stewart J. D’Alessio, Three Strikes and You’re Out: 
The Impact of California’s New Mandatory Sentencing Law on Serious Crime Rates, 43 Crime & Delin. 457, 465 
(1997); Coalition for Juvenile Justice, Childhood on Trial: The Failure of trying and sentencing Youth in Adult 
Criminal Court (2005), at http://www.juvjustice.org/publications/2005ar.html (this research-based report identifies 
the public safety and rehabilitative failures of our nation’s “adult time for adult crime” policies and reaffirms the 
effectiveness of retaining the vast majority of juvenile offenders in the juvenile justice system).  
47
 See James C. Howell, Juvenile Transfers to the Criminal Justice System: State-of-the-Art, Law and Policy, 18, 17-
60 (1996); Donna Bishop, C. Frazier, L. Lanza-Kaduce, & H. White, The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: 
Does it make a Difference? Crime and Delinquency, 41, 171-191 (1996) (recidivism of youths who were transferred 
to criminal court in Florida in 1987 was compared with that of those retained in the juvenile system.  Results 
indicated that transferred youths quickly re-offended at a higher rate than matched non-transferred youth.  The 
seriousness of re-offending was also greater for the transfer group than non-transfer group, with transfers more 
likely to commit a subsequent felony offense.); Fagan, supra note 46; C. Mason & S. Chang, Re-arrest rates among 
youth sentenced in Adult Court: An Evaluation of the Juvenile Sentencing Advocacy Project, Juvenile Sentencing 
Advocacy Project, Miami-Dade County Public Defender’s Office (2001), 
http://www.pdmiami.com/JSAP_2001_Impact_Evaluation.pdf  (youth tried as adults who were given adult 
sentences were twice as likely to re-offend as youth who are sentenced to juvenile justice programs.  Over a one-
year time period, almost 90% of the youth sentenced to adult probation or boot camp re-offended; in contrast, 40% 
of youth who received juvenile justice sanctions re-offended); Winner, supra note 46; Donna Bishop, Juvenile 
Offenders in the Adult Criminal Justice System, 27 Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, 81, 85 (2000) 
(juveniles prosecuted as adults had higher rates of re-arrest for serious felony crimes, were rearrested more quickly, 
and were more often returned to incarceration); Marcy Rasmussen Podkopacs & Barry C. Feld, The End of the Line: 
An Empirical Study of Judicial Waiver, 86 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 449, 451-452 (1996); S. W. Henggeler, 
Multisystemic Treatment of Antisocial Behavior in Children and Adolescents, New York: Guilford (1998); C. 
Spohn & D. Holleran, The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug 
Offenders, Criminology, 40, 329-357 (2002); R.E. Redding, Recidivism rates in Juvenile versus Criminal Court.  
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in New York state that juvenile transfers to criminal courts had no deterrent effect).48  Many juvenile 
offenders transferred to criminal court do not receive a prison sentence.49  If they do there is little 
consistency in sentencing rationale or length.50 
Transferring juveniles to adult criminal court systems eliminates rehabilitative or treatment  
options for those juveniles who could benefit because adult prison systems offer few treatment modalities 
to inmates;51 loosens ties with family members with which they are ultimately reunified because adult 
prisons, compared to juvenile facilities, are much further in distance from the youths’ community;52 
harms youth during adult prison incarceration with increased physical trauma experienced and an inability 
to separate youths from adults in the facilities;53 and decreases chances of future employment after adult 
                                                                                                                                                             
Juvenile Justice Fact Sheet, Charlottesville, VA: Institute of Law, Psychiatry, & Public Policy, University of 
Virginia (2000). 
48
 Id.  See S.I. Singer, Recminalizing delinquency: Violent juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Reform, New York: 
Cambridge University Press (1996); E.A. Risler, Evaluating the Georgia Legislative Waiver’s Effectiveness in 
Deterring Juvenile Crime, Research on Social Work Practice, 8, 657-667; M.R. Podkopacz, & B.C. Feld, Judicial 
Wavier Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness and Race, Law and Inequality, 14, 101-207 (1995). 
49
 California Senate Report 1993-1994 Session (AB 560) at 7 (“One criminologist has observed that only about 10-
12% of juveniles now transferred to criminal court serve any time in California.”); see Fagan, supra note 33 at 802. 
50
 Id.  See Kevin Strom, Steve Smith, & Howard N. Snyder, United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts, at Highlights (Sept., 1998; NCJ 165815) (“About a third 
of juveniles in criminal courts sentenced to State prison received a sentence of 4 years or less.  The average prison 
sentence for juveniles convicted in criminal courts was about 9 years; for those convicted of a violent offense, the 
average prison sentence was nearly 11 years.”). 
51
 See Mark W. Lipsey, David B. Wilson, & Lynn Cothern, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Preventions, 
Juvenile Justice Bulletin, Effective Intervention for Serious Juvenile Offenders (Apr. 2000) (reviews treatment 
modalities for youth). 
52
 See Redding, supra note 47; R. Seltzer, Juveniles with Mental Disabilities: When Incarceration makes Youth 
Worse, Juvenile Justice Update, 7(2), 9-10 (2001). 
53
 Id. See Moffit infra note 62, at 691 (drug habits; re-incarceration); Jeffery Fagan, The Comparative Impacts of 
Juvenile versus Criminal Court Sanctions on Recidivism among Adolescent Felony Offenders, 18 Law & Pol’y 77, 
100 (1996); Martin Forst, Youth in Prisons and Training Schools: Perceptions and Consequences of the Treatment-
Custody Dichotomy, 40(1) Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 1, 9 (1989) (citing trauma experienced during incarceration); Lee H. 
Bowker, Prison Victimization (1980); John Irwin, Prisons in Turmoil (1980); Daniel Lockwood, Prison Sexual 
Violence (1980); Kristina H. Chung, Note, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in Adult Jails, 
66 Ind. L.J. 999, 1006-07; Mark Fleischer, Beggars and Thieves (1995); Richard C. Jones & Thomas J. Schmid, 
Doing Time: Prison Experience and Identity among First-time Inmates, 78-79, 84-86 (2000); P. Allard & M. Young, 
Prosecuting Juveniles in Adult Court: Perspectives for Policymakers and Practitioners (2002) at 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/2079.pdf (“children who are incarcerated in adult facilities are at great risk . . 
. those who are convicted but not imprisoned may still suffer long lasting negative consequences); J. Austin, 
Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (2000), at 
http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf (report discusses legal issues relating to conditions of confinement of 
youth in adult facilities, characteristics of juveniles house in adult jails and prisons, management issues and 
alternative strategies and technical assistance).  
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criminal justice processing because record expungement is much more difficult..54  A majority of juvenile 
felony offenders in secure custody facilities have a mental health disorder (40 to 90%), substance abuse 
addiction (37 to 73%), and/or a special education disability (33 to 41%).55  Adult court systems are not 
equipped to deal with inmates’ significant disability needs.56 
 
III. The Evolution from Kent v. U.S. to “Tough on Crime” State Law to Roper v. Simmons 
Why the disconnect between intended policy goals and research findings for these youth?  The 
Supreme Court seems to have articulated the answer in their Roper decision through abolishment of the 
death penalty for sixteen-and seventeen-year-old offenders based on “evolving standards of decency” in 
finding the punishment grossly disproportionate because of juveniles’ underdeveloped sense of 
responsibility, lack of maturity, vulnerability to peer pressure, and less-fixed transitory personalities.57   
                                                 
54
 See R. Freeman, Crime and Employment of Disadvantaged Youth, in G. Peterson & W. Vroman, eds., Urban 
Labor Markets and Job Opportunity (201-238), Washington, D.C., National Academy Press (1992). 
55
 See J.C. Howell, Preventing and Reducing Juvenile Delinquency: A Comprehensive Framework, Sage 
Publications (2003); Christopher Mallett, Juvenile Court Probation Supervised Youth: At-risk in Cuyahoga County, 
Ohio, Corrections Compendium, (March/Aprill, 2006) (a review of all 3,880 probation-supervised youth in 2003 
identified 42% had a mental health disorder, 39% had a substance abuse disorder, and 25% received special 
education services); S. Jung & E.P. Rawana, Risk and Need Assessment of Juvenile Offenders, Criminal Justice and 
Behavior, 26, 69-90 (1999); D. McBride, C., Vanderwall, Y., B. Terry, & H. Van Buren, Breaking the Cycle of 
Drug use among Juvenile Offenders, Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University, Department of Behavioral Sciences 
(1999); National Center on Education, Disability, and Juvenile Justice, Best and Promising Practices for Short-Term 
Jails and Detentions Centers, EDJJ Notes, 1, 2-3 (2002); L. Teplin, K. Abram, G. McCloelland, M. Dulcan, & A., 
Mericle, Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, Archives of General Psychiatry, 59, 1133-1143 
(2002) (study found over two-thirds of youth were diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder); F. Lexon & R.E. Redding, 
Mental Health Needs of Juvenile Offenders, Juvenile Correctional Mental Health Report, 3(1), 2, 8-16 (2000); M.P. 
Dawkins, Drug Use and Violent Crime among Adolescents, Adolescence, 32(126), 395-405 (identified over one-
half of youth with substance abuse disorders); National Institute of Justice, Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring: 
Annual Report, (2003) http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/nij/103013.pdf; T. Ulzen & H. Hamilton, The Nature and 
Characteristics of Psychiatric Comorbidity in Incarcerated Adolescents, Canadian Journal of Research, 43, 57-63 
(1998); S. Burrell & L. Warboys, Special Education and the Juvenile Justice System, OJJDP, Department of Justice, 
(2000); K. Malmgren, R. Abbott, & D. Hawkins, Learning Disability and Delinquency: Rethinking the “Link”, 
Journal of Learning Disabilities, 32, 194-200 (1999); Linda Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders of Youth in 
Detention, OJJDP, Juvenile Justice Programs (April 2006), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ojjdp (two-thirds of males and 
nearly three-quarters of females in Cook County, Illinois detention center met the diagnostic criteria for one or more 
psychiatric disorders). 
56
 See Lipsey, supra note 51; T. F. Geraghty, Justice for Children: How do we get There?, Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 88, 190-241 (2001). 
57
 See Roper, supra notes 24, 25, & 26.  The Court cites Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, 
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 Am. Psychologist 1009, 
1014 (2003) (“as legal minors, juveniles lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a 
criminogenic setting”); Eric Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968) (seminal research on adolescent 
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These youth developmental differences relied on by the Court in the Roper holding are well 
documented in research literature.58  Adolescent development is marked by immaturity and less 
responsible decision-making.59  Adolescents are group focused in their development, greatly influenced 
by other peers,60 and more likely to commit violent crimes in groups.61  Adolescence is an ongoing 
process of youth personality growth and identity formation.62 
Current State Law 
                                                                                                                                                             
developmental stages); and A. Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 
Developmental Review 339 (1992). 
58
 See Fagan, supra note 46; Clark, supra note 19; Abigail A. Baird, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of 
Facial Affect Recognition in Children and Adolescents, 38 J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 195 (1999); 
American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, Brief for the American Medical Association et al., at 2, 
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1633549 (amicus brief filed in Roper v. 
Simmons that stated “cutting-edge brain imaging technology reveals that regions of the adolescent brain do not 
reach a fully mature state until after the age of 18”); Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of 
Consequential Thought: Evidence from Neuroscience, 349 Phil. Transactions: Biological Sci. 1797 (2004); Paul 
Raeburn, Too Immature for the Death Penalty?, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 17, 2004, at 26, 29.  Michael Stark, 
Editorial, A Case for Concern, Wash. Post, June 8, 2003, at B8.  
59
 Ellen Greenberger, Education and the Acquisition of Psycho-Social Maturity, in the Development of Social 
Maturity, 165-72 (David C. McClelland, ed., 1982); Elizabeth Scott, Criminal Responsibility in Adolescence: 
Lessons from Developmental Psychology, in Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice 291, 
310 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwarts, eds., 2000); Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Researching 
Adolescents’ Judgment and Culpability, in Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice 291, 
310 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwarts, eds., 2000); Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 15, 61 (1997); Christopher Alobogin, A Prevention Model of Juvenile Justice: The Promise 
of the Kansas v. Hendricks for Children, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 185, 198; Laurence Steinberg, Should Juvenile 
Offenders be tried as Adults?: A Developmental Perspective on Changing Legal Policies, 2000 Joint Center for 
Poverty Research, Vol. 2(3), at 
http://www.jcpr.org/wpfiles/Steinberg_briefing.pdf?CFID=1086705&CFTOKEN=65755018. 
60
 See Norman A. Sprinthall & Andrew Collins, Adolescent Psychology: A Developmental View (1988); Thomas J. 
Berndt, Developmental Changes in Conformity to Peers and Parents, 15 Dev. Psychol. 608 (1979); Bradford Brown, 
Peer Groups and Peer Cultures, in At the Threshold: The Developing Adolescent 171, 181 (S. Shirley Feldman & 
Glen R. Elliott, eds., 1990); Laurence Steinberg & Susan B. Silverberg, The Vicissitudes of Autonomy in Early 
Adolescence, 57 Child Dev. 841 (1986); Peter Blos, The Adolescent Passage: Developmental Issues 71-72, 160 
(1979); Geoffrey P. Hunt & Karen Joe Laidler, Alcohol and Violence in the Lives of Gang Members, 25 Alcohol 
Res. & Health 66, 67-68.   
61
 See Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, U.S. Department of Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: A 
National Report 55 (1995); Jeffrey Arnett, The Young and the Restless: Adolescent Reckless Behavior, 4 Current 
Directions in Psychol. Sci. 67 (1995) (noting that biology and social values conspire to promote reckless behavior 
among adolescents).  
62
 See Erikson, supra note 57; Cauffman, supra note 59 at 255-285; Peter Blos, The Second Individuation Process of 
Adolescence, in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 183-198 (describing early adolescence individuation); Terrie 
E. Moffitt, Adolescence-Limited and Life-Course-Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental Taxonomy, 100 
Psychol. Rev. 674, 75 (1993); Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 326 (1984). 
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A review of current state (and District of Columbia) judicial (and limited prosecutorial) statutes 
waiver criteria63 finds significantly limited reflection of the Roper juvenile offender culpability factors, 
identifies many states that do not comport with numerous Kent review factors, and reflects significant 
punitive state policies.64 
1. No current state law waiver criteria reviews youths’ transitory personality or less formed 
character.65  However, 27.5% of states (and District of Columbia) review the youths’ mental and/or 
emotional condition.66  Most of these state laws do not report how to “review” these criteria, two state 
laws require records or report reviewing,67 and one state law requires a juvenile court-ordered 
examination and report.68 
2. The maturity of the offending youth is reviewed by only 26 of 51 (50.9%) of the states.69   
Twenty-three of these states utilize the Kent definition,70 while three states review for “maturity”.71 
3. Vulnerability to peer pressure and negative influences72 is reviewed by only two states (Arkansas,  
                                                 
63
 Ala. Code § 12-15-34 (2005); Alaska Stat. § 47.12.100 (2004); Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 8-327 (2004); Ark. Code Ann. § 
9-27-318 (2005); Welf. & Inst. Code Div. 2; Pt., 1, Ch. 2, § 7 (2004); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-2-518 (2005); Conn. 
Gen. Stat. § 46b-127 (2004); Del. Code Ann. Tit. 10, § 921, 1010 (2005); 1981 D.C. Stat. 16-2307; Fla. Stat. § 
985.226 (2005);  Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-39 (2004); Haw. Rev. Stat. 3-31 § 571-22 (2005); Idaho Code § 20-508, 
20-509 (2005); 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. 405/5-4 (2004); Ind. Code § 31-30-3-1 (2004); Iowa Code § 232.45 (2005); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-1636 (2005); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635.020, 649.010 (2004); La. Code Juv. Proc. Ann. III, 4, 
Art. 857 (2006); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 15, § 3101 (2005); Md. Code Ann., § 3-817 (1999); Mich. Comp. Laws § 
712A.4 (2004); Minn. Stat. §260.125 (2004);  Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (2000); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.071 
(2004); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-5-203 (2005); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-27 (2004); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 62.080 (2005); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 169-B:24 (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-1-8 (2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:4A-26 (2004); Crim. 
Proc. § 1.20, 180.75, 210.43 (2004); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-608 (2005); N.D. Cent. Code § 27-20-34 (2005); Ohio 
Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.26 (2005);  Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7303-4.3 (2005); Or. Rev. Stat. § 419C.340 (2004); 42 PA. 
Stat. Ann. § 6355 (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-7 (2004); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-7605 (2005); S.D. Codified Laws 
§ 2-11-4 (2004); Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-134 (2005); Fam. § 54.02 (2004); Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603; Vt. Stat. 
Ann. Titl 33, § 5506 (2006); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-269.1(A) (2005); Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40-110 (2006); W. Va. 
Code § 49-5-10 (2005); Wis. Stat. § 938.18 (2005); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-6-237 (2005).  
64
 See Appendix for full listing of state (and District of Columbia) law criteria.  This state law list is current as of the 
2004 to 2006 state legislatures.   
65
 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. 
66
 Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of Columbia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, New York, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
67
 Arkansas and California. 
68
 Ohio. 
69
 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188; Kent, 383 U.S. at 556-557. 
70
 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. 
71
 New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. 
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determining whether the youth offense was committed “alone or in a group”; and Utah, determining 
whether “two or more youth” committed the offense).73  Three additional states review whether the 
youths’ offense was “committed while involved in gang or syndicate enterprises”, but the focus is 
punitive not culpability.74 
4. Four states do not allow any other transfer criteria outside the statute to be reviewed.75  One of  
these states requires that two of the delineated seven factors76 must be reviewed in the transfer decision.77 
5. While many state statutes follow some of the Kent criteria,78 many do not:79 only 78.4% review  
safety and/or protection of the community;80 only 66.7% review the youths’ prior juvenile court record,81 
with 19.6% specifically reviewing previous felony offenses,82 and two states requiring this review in all 
transfer decisions;83 only 65.5% review the seriousness (nature) of the offense,84 with three states 
requiring this factor to be reviewed;85 only 54.9% review youth treatment that is available,86 with two 
states requiring a review of how close the youth is to age eighteen;87 only 50.9% review youth maturity;88 
                                                                                                                                                             
72
 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. 
73
 See Appendix. 
74
 Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee. 
75
 Idaho, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. 
76
 Seriousness of the offense; and safety of the community. 
77
 Kentucky. 
78
 Kent, supra note 12. 
79
 See Appendix for full state criteria listings. 
80
 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New 
Hampshire, New York, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
81
 Alabama, Alaska Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
82
 Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
83
 Michigan and Minnesota. 
84
 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, 
New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
85
 Kentucky, Michigan, and Minnesota. 
86
 Alaska, Arizona, California, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
87
 Ohio and Virginia. 
  Death is not different  
  Criminal Law Bulletin, 2007, (in press) 15 
only 46.2% review the likelihood of the youths’ rehabilitation;89 only 41.5% review whether the offense 
was violent, aggressive, premeditated, or willful,90 with only one state that did not adopt the Kent 
definition;91 only 37.3% review youths’ past treatment efforts and responses;92 and only 37.0% review 
whether the offense was against person or property.93  
6. A limited number of current state statute criteria are in line with the Court’s Roper holdings on  
youth culpability: 27.5% review youths’ mental and emotional condition;94 15.7% review materials 
related to youths’ mental, physical, educational, and social history,95 with two states making this a court-
ordered requirement;96 13.7% review whether the youth is subject to mental institutionalization;97 5.8% 
review youths’ motivation to commit the offense;98 and 2.0% review youths’ demeanor.99 
7. Some current state statute review criteria reflect the post-Kent punitive policy shifts: 13.7%  
review whether any codefendants are being tried as adult offenders;100 9.8% review previous juvenile 
residential or secure facility placements;101 7.8% review any other anti-social or physical violence 
history;102 and 5.9% review the number of other alleged, unadjudicated offenses.103 
8. Youth waiver to adult criminal court based on probable cause evidentiary requirements are  
                                                                                                                                                             
88
 Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
89
 Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, 
New Hampshire, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
90
 Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and 
Wyoming. 
91
 Missouri. 
92
 Alabama, California, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Minnesota, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wisconsin. 
93
 Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
94
 See supra note 66. 
95
 California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
96
 California and Wisconsin. 
97
 California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee. 
98
 Nebraska, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
99
 Alabama. 
100
 Delaware, Florida, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
101
 Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Ohio, and Virginia. 
102
 Arizona, Kansas, Michigan, and Nebraska.  
103
 Kansas, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 
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necessary in only 25.5% of the states.104  Over 37.0% of the states (and District of Columbia) require less 
than probable cause evidence (reasonable suspicion or reasonable cause – 13.7%;105 clear and convincing 
evidence – 11.8%;106 and preponderance of the evidence – 11.8%107).  Over 33% of state statutes do not 
specify the level of evidence required.108 
9. In over 60.0% of the states (including District of Columbia), once a youth is transferred to  
adult criminal court the youth will always be considered an adult for any future offense.109  Seven state 
statutes (13.7%) do not specify this transfer rule.110 
10.  Six states (11.8%) have no statute directing juvenile transfers to adult criminal courts.111 
  
Death is Not Different  
The Supreme Court has found juvenile offenders less culpable than adult offenders because of 
youth developmental issues.112  The Court in Roper held specifically the death-sentencing of 16- and 17-
year-olds unconstitutional in finding less support “to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a 
juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character”.113   
                                                 
104
 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, and North Carolina. 
105
 District of Columbia, Georgia, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Tennessee. 
106
 Arkansas, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
107
 Maine, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia. 
108
 Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, 
South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. 
109
 See supra note 31.  Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, 
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
110
 Alaska, Colorado, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, and West Virginia. 
111
 Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Washington. 
112
 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. 
113
 Id.  The Court referenced three research studies: Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective, 12 Developmental Review 339 (1992) (“adolescents are over-represented statistically in virtually every 
category of reckless behavior”); Steinberg & Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental 
Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 48 Am. Psychologist 1009, 1014 (2003) 
(“as legal minors, juveniles lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting”); 
and Eric Erikson, Identity: Youth and Crisis (1968) (seminal research on childhood and adolescent developmental 
stages); supra notes 58, 59, 60, & 61 (research cited supports and expands upon the Court’s citations, reinforcing 
these findings across broad sociological studies). 
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Most current state law does not follow the Court’s original Kent discussed criteria on youth 
maturity and rehabilitation factors and only a few states incorporate the recent Roper criteria finding 
youth less culpable because of underdeveloped maturity, transitory personalities, and peer influences.114  
The states that follow some of the Roper holdings have done so serendipitously, with legislative changes 
enacted prior to the Court’s decision in March 2005. 
Florida and North Carolina are not states that follow the Kent or Roper holdings.  For many 
months, national reporting portrayed the tragic prosecution in Florida of Lionel Tate (12 at the time of the 
crime) and Nathan Brazill (16 at the time of the crime) for first and second degree murder, respectively, 
as the state legislature utilized the prosecutorial waiver to bypass the juvenile courts and required adult 
criminal court adjudication and subsequent conviction (Tate received an original life sentence, now 
serving 30 years for a probation violation; Brazill is currently serving a 28-year sentence).115  Similarly, 
thirteen-year-old Andre Green was transferred to criminal court, convicted of sexual assault, and 
sentenced to his current life imprisonment without parole – eight years after the North Carolina legislature 
required this outcome for youth as young as thirteen.116  “From a moral standpoint it would be misguided 
to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s 
character deficiencies will be reformed”.117  A majority of juvenile transfers to criminal courts do not 
allow for reformation of the youth.118 
A moratorium on juvenile offender transfers to adult criminal courts must be declared.119  
Approximately 200,000 youth are transferred to criminal courts each year, with a significant percentage 
                                                 
114
 See Appendix. 
115
 See Green, supra note 46 at 234. 
116
 See Andrew M. Clark, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutional Infancy Defense, 2006, 54 Kan. L. Rev. 687 
(for detailed case description and an extended discussion of why Constitutional due process rights support an 
infancy defense not allowing criminal prosecution of anyone under the age of fourteen). 
117
 Roper, 125 S. Ct. at 1188. 
118
 See supra notes 31 & 35. 
119
 See Campaign 4 Youth Justice (new national initiative to raise awareness about the impact of prosecuting youth 
in the adult criminal justice system) at http://www.campaign4youthjustice.org/; the American Psychiatric 
Association Board of Trustees position statement is for the federal and state governments to “review and develop a 
strategy to reform current transfer/waiver options”, at http://www.psych.org/; the National Education Association 
stated position is in opposition to prosecuting, detaining and imprisoning youth in the adult criminal justice system, 
at http://www.nea.org/index.html; Christopher Hartney (National Council on Crime and Delinquency), Youth Under 
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permanently transferred to prosecution within the adult criminal justice system.120  The Supreme Court in 
Roper has drawn a clear bright line on youth culpability based upon developmental issues and 
rehabilitation.  It is now up to the states to reflect this holding and change the current harmful, outmoded 
concept of juvenile culpability.   
The Court struck down the juvenile death sentence reasoning that juvenile offenders are truly 
different than adult offenders.  Transferring juveniles to adult criminal courts as states currently do 
disregards the Court’s current holding.  The outcome of death sentencing juveniles or transferring them to 
adult criminal courts is the same – no youth receives a second chance.  Death is not different.   
                                                                                                                                                             
age 18 in the Adult Criminal Justice System Fact Sheet (2006) at 
http://www.nccdnrc.org/nccd/pubs/2006may_factsheet_youthadult.pdf; Sally T. Green, Prosecutorial Wavier into 
Adult Criminal Court: A Conflict of Interests Violation Amounting to the States’ Legislative Abrogation of 
Juveniles’ Due Process Rights, 110 Penn St. L. Rev. 233 (2005) (advocating for the application of parens patriae 
juvenile court role and review of developmental factors in greatly decreasing or eliminating judicial and 
prosecutorial transfer laws); American Bar Association, Youth in the Criminal Justice System: Guidelines for 
Policymakers and Practitioners (2001) (“youth are developmentally different from adults, and these developmental 
differences need to be taken into account at all stages and in all aspects of the adult criminal justice system . . . 
judges in the adult criminal justice system should consider the individual characteristics of the youth during 
sentencing”); Marrus & Rosenberg, supra note 17 (advocating that “ developmental and psychological distinctions 
between adults and adolescents, differences that the Simmons Court believed was constitutionally relevant regarding 
execution, should also be considered in determining the extent of punishment for juveniles who commit serious 
criminal acts . . . favoring a categorical bar against waiver of children to criminal court”.); Larry Cunningham, 
Substantive Limitations on the Power of Family Courts to Commit Delinquent Juveniles to State Custody: Analysis 
and Critique, 55 Syracuse L. Rev. 87 (2004) (“Ultimately, the legal system must trust its judges.  Family court 
judges are particularly well suited to make fact-intensive inquiries in juvenile dispositions.  Providing standards and 
factors to juvenile judges, along with limited appellate review, will ensure that commitment will only be used for the 
cases that deserve such a severe sanction.”); David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile 
Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 1555 (2004) (“We need to bring 
consistency to our views about adolescents.  The trend to try juveniles as adults is inconsistent with retributive, 
rehabilitative, and deterrent rationales for punishment and with the related rationales for having a separate system of 
juvenile justice in the first place.  A sound criminal jurisprudence requires that we stop treating juvenile offenders as 
little adults.”); Bree Langemo, Serious Consequences for Serious Juvenile Offenders: Do Juveniles Belong in Adult 
Court?, 30 Ohio N.U.L. Rev (2004) (“Juveniles should not be subject to the serious consequences of being tried and 
convicted in adult court for four main reasons: 1) recent trends are based on misconceptions; 2) methods used to 
place juveniles in adult court have significant flaws; 3) adults courts are not sensitive to the needs of juveniles; and 
4) juveniles are not adults.”); John roman & Jeffrey A. Butts, Economics of Juvenile Jurisdiction, Urban Institute 
(August 2005) (cost-benefit analysis concluding fiscal caution in transferring youth to the criminal court system); 
Christopher Hartney, National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Fact Sheet: Youth Under Age 18 in the Adult 
Criminal Justice System (June 2006). 
120
 See supra notes 31, 33, & 35. 
